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HSE is a compulsory aspect to be considered in any industry and even process for that
matter. Various accidents and disasters have occurred due to negligence of HSE aspect.
Few of the major ones are the Alpha Piper incident, Union Charbide Bhopal incident
and the Longford incident HSE MS is the synergy of health, safety and environment
aspect of industry. The implementation of HSE MS as structured set of controls for
managing HSE; will ensure and to demonstrate the HSE objectives set in the policy are
met. The purpose of this report is to represent the final output of study on Development
of HSEMS tool base on Shell Malaysia Trading Bagan Luar oil depot operations. This
HSE MS tool can also be define as information management model for HSE data. This
paper presents the project focusing on the problem statement and the objective as well
as the scope of study. It also covers the analytical review ofwritten materials HSE MS
and the methodology that will be used in completing this project. The result and
discussion of this project is also touched in this report. There is also an insight of
conclusion and recommendations for this project.
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CHAPTER 1.0
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of Study
HSE is a grave issue in any industry. It is a responsible that must be adhered by all
industrial practitioners. Various accidents and disasters have occurred due to negligence
of HSE aspect. Few of the major ones are the Alpha Piper incident, Union Charbide
Bhopal incident and the Longford incident. The need of a proper HSE MS was the
major finding from the investigation of Alpha Piper incident by Lord Cullen
Committee. Advancement of information technology beckons the need to enhance HSE
MS to adapt to the current information wave. Nowadays, industrial practitioners
develop HSE MS that fulfill legal requirements and the system is usually certified. The
HSE MS are usually documented as hard copy for reference and inter connected
through the organization's intranet. Few examples of currently practiced HSE MS are
Shell's HSSE MS and also Petronas HSE MS known as Petronas Technical Standard.
The current system is not comprehensive in the sense that the HSE elements are not
compiled together in the HSE MS The challenge of this study is to link the HSE
elements in the HSE MS in a LAN environment within the facility and make it a
operational system whereby users can easily launch the HSE MS tool from the comfort
of their desktop. This study will utilize current available HSE MS that adheres to local
legislation and international certified standards practiced by Shell Malaysia Trading and
high-level language computer software to create an interface for HSE MS that is easily
navigated and available on desktops. This will ensure industries have an effective and
continuously exercised HSE MS and evolve HSE MS itself.
1.2 Problem Statement
Law and regulations on occupational safety and health and environment continue to be
more stringent due to boost of public awareness and knowledge of future consequences.
The current competitive market drives industrial practitioners to adopt Sustainable
Development (SD) concept to build a competitive and sustainable business by vying for
certification. The certification will boost the reputation of the business entity and
project it as a good corporate citizen. The answer to all of the problems identified above
is implementation of a HSE MS. HSE MS is modeled through international certified
standards such as ISO 14001 and ISO 18001 and also local law and regulations. HSE
MS main feature is to maintain all hazards of operation or activities at ALARP.
Furthermore, HSE MS can also avoid future complications during decommissioning,
legal acts and audits. Current practice HSE MS are usually documented as hard copy for
reference and inter connected through the organization's intranet. Therefore, the system
is more manual oriented rather than practice oriented and requires major human
participation. Complications on documentation such as misplace of records and data due
to human failure and inefficiency will result in impairment of HSE MS and defeat its
main purpose. The HSE elements are also not synergize in HSE MS in a sense that
current HSE MS encompasses only on the procedure but not on the practice. A classic
example is that HSE MS mentions the need to maintain hazard at ALARP but it doesn't
provide the tools on how to execute this need.
This research will study the possible evolution of HSE MS by creating it as tool or
simple interactive software applicable to be use on computers and tackle all the above
mentioned problems on documentation. This study introduces a new concept of
integrating HSE elements in HSE MS as an added value to current practice. The
significant of this study is the end product will be a marketable product that can be
utilize by industrial practitioners. The end product is a HSE MS tool that can be applied
and continuously exercised on computers. This will enable wider personnel coverage
and a more transparent systemin managing HSE issues that can be objectively audited.
1.3 Objective Of Study
The purpose of this study is to develop a marketable and functional HSE MS tool
base on Bagan Luar oil depot operations.
This tool would be HSE MS software for operations of the depot in maintaining
hazards at ALARP.
To demonstrate the concept of integrating HSE elements and HSE MS components
in HSE MS tool.
To develop HSE MS tool for application of Bagan Luar oil depot in Penang.
To avoid disastrous tragedy by reducing human failure by managing HSE data
through HSE MS tool.
To cultivate safety and HSE culture by participation ofpersonnel.
1.4 Scope of Study.
This study will encompass on the objective to develop a HSE MS. Current HSE MS are
exposed to two major weaknesses which are mismanagement of data and also non
inclusive of HSE elements and tools. This will ensure main objective of HSE to manage
hazards at ALARP is achieved. This study will develop a tool that will integrate HSE
elements and tools that will be explored in latter stages of this report. The final output
of this study will be HSE MS tool that has marketable and functional for industry.
This study will be conducted on case study basis. The identified participant in this study
is Shell Malaysia Trading Distribution depot at Bagan Luar, Penang. The final output
will not only enhance HSE performance of the depot, maintain hazards at ALARP but
also will assist depot operations and act as a training kit for external parties from the
depot. This scope of this research project is feasible with the available resources. The
resources emphasize here are time, information, collaboration with external parties and
finance. The project time frame is presented in Appendix 1. This project is a win-win
situation whereby it satisfies the external party as well as UTP requirements for FYP.
CHAPTER 2.0
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY
2.1 HSE MS
Management System is a structured set of controls for managing the business; to ensure
and to demonstrate that business objectives are met. HSE MS is a structured set of
controls for managing HSE; to ensure and to demonstrate the HSE objectives set in the
policy are met. HSE is important to control risk and demonstrate ability to control risk
of the industry at ALARP. HSE MS can also improve performance and ensure
compliance to legal requirements. HSE MS can also make the industry more appalling
through international standards certification. It is well documented that public
awareness on HSE issues is on the rise and multinational companies prefer to be
associated with business entities with certification. HSE MS can also help prevent
repetition of past incidents and disasters such as Alpha Piper Incident, Union Charbide
Bhopal incident and also Longford incident.
A classic example of inefficient HSE MS is the Longford incident. A major explosion at
the Longford gas refinery in Australia resulted in 2 deaths and 8 injuries. The refinery
met 95% of Victoria's gas needs. The hiatus in supply led to power shortages. The
power shortages led to considerable pressure from many stakeholders. Business
implications and reputation was severely threatened and there was a risk that cross-
border competitors could dent Esso's market share. The investigation findings redirect
the cause to weakness in documentation and records. This is the current weakness in
current HSE MS as mentioned in earlier section. This study will tackle this weakness.
HSE MS is the synergy between health, safety and environment matters for the
industry. It governs all the above-mentioned laws and international standards.
Therefore, HSE MS is a must for any industry in order to even initiate their business.




















The example of controls in HSE MS refers to controls through leadership and
commitment, organization, policy, task and responsibilities, law and authority,
standards, procedure and work instructions, performance measurements, audits,
management review and appraisal.
Team leaders or management level should be fully committed to achieving the
objectives of the HSE MS, and providing a leading role for all depot personnel and
contractors by encouraging: Belief: in the company's commitment to improve HSE
performance. Motivation: to improve personal HSE performance. Participation: of staff
at all levels in working to achieve excellent HSSE performance. This are controls
through leadership and commitment.
Organization and allocation of task and responsibilities enable optimization ofresources
in enabling implementation of an effective HSE MS. Through these control measures
personnel can work as a unit and together manage HSEissues.
Policy is the goal orobjective orplan. Therefore it is an important control inmanaging
HSE. Below is a sample of HSE policy for a multinational company. The presence of
thispolicy acts a guideline for personnel in managing HSE.
have a systematic approach to HSSE management designed to ensure compliance
with the law and to achieve continuous performance improvement;
set targets for improvement andmeasures, appraise andreport performance;
require contractors to manage HSSE in linewith this policy;
require joint ventures under our operational control to apply this policy and use our
influence to promote it in its other ventures;
include HSSE performance in the appraisal of allstaffand reward accordingly.
Law and authority is the best route in controlling any activity including HSE.
Environmental Quality Act 1974 (EQA) is the law that regulates environmental aspect
while Occupational Safety and Health 1994 (OSHA) protect safety and health of
personnel. Both these laws also protect the interest of third party. Department of
Environment (DOE) and Department of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH) are
the bodies held accountable to ensure the laws are abide.
There are available standards on HSE aspect which are applied inbusiness on voluntary
basis. ISO 18001 is the international standard certification for occupational health and
ISO 9000 is the international standard certification for safety.lSO 14001 is the
international standard certification for environmental management system.
Environmental Management Systems (EMS) have been in existence since the 1970s.
Their development was associated with the tightening of legislation which placed
additional responsibilities on industry to reduce its impact on the environment. An
Environmental Management System serves to link the different processes and business
units of which all organisations are comprised, in order to assist organisations to
achieve environmental goals. This ensures potential adverse environmental impacts are











Figure 2: ISO 14001 elements flowchart
Leadership and commitment is essential for the successful implementation of a
Management System ofany type. It is important that this element ofthe EMS is inplace
priorto the implementation of subsequent stages.
Environmental Policy defines the organisation's intent in terms of the environment
.EMS ultimately aimto implement the intentions stated in the Policy.
Plan is identifying the requirements of ISO 14001 and planning and organising system
implementation, involves identifying the environmental impacts associated with the
organisation, legislative requirements, setting environmental objectives and planning
their means of achievement
Business and organization do apply controls of HSE aspect through motivation.
Performance measurements, audits, management review and appraisal are means of
motivation. Personnel are rewarded accordingly through appraisal and performance
measurement. Therefore, they will strive to achieve all policy set for HSE. Audit and
management review are tools or controls to ensure HSE MS or controls set are
followed.
2.2 HSE Tools
The ultimate goal of HSE is to maintain all hazards and risk at ALARP. There are
various available tools to achieve this objective. Selected tools will be applied in
integrating HSE elements in HSE MS to develop the HSE MS tool for this project.
Below is the summary of available tools or aids:
2.2.1 ASPIN
ASPIN provide an easy-to-use quantitative failure risk assessment tool to compare
different options and conditions during pipeline design and operation and to assist in
optimising and planning inspection and maintenance efforts.
Leadership and commitment is essential for the successful implementation of a
Management System ofany type. It is important that this element of the EMS is in place
prior to the implementation ofsubsequent stages.
Environmental Policy defines the organisation's intent in terms of the environment
.EMS ultimately aim to implement the intentions stated in the Policy .
Plan is identifying the requirements of ISO 14001 and planning and organising system
implementation, involves identifying the environmental impacts associated with the
organisation, legislative requirements, setting environmental objectives and planning
their means of achievement
Business and organization do apply controls of HSE aspect through motivation.
Performance measurements, audits, management review and appraisal are means of
motivation. Personnel are rewarded accordingly through appraisal and performance
measurement. Therefore, they will strive to achieve all policy set for HSE. Audit and
management review are tools or controls to ensure HSE MS or controls set are
followed.
2.2 HSE Tools
The ultimate goal of HSE is to maintain all hazards and risk at ALARP. There are
various available tools to achieve this objective. Selected tools will be applied in
integrating HSE elements in HSE MS to develop the HSE MS tool for this project.
Below is the summary of available tools or aids:
2.2.1 ASPIN
ASPIN provide an easy-to-use quantitative failure risk assessment tool to compare
different options and conditions during pipeline design and operation and to assist in
optimising and planning inspectionand maintenance efforts.
It is a tool that is situated between a full Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) and
simple risk ranking/scoring methods, less complicated and expensive than the former
and more quantitative (and therefore more accurate) than the latter. It is intended as a
decision support tool and does not specify acceptance criteria for risk levels. It can, for
example, identify the effect ofuse ofinspection pigging and a leak detection system on
risk levels.
The methodology is based on the generally applied risk analysis technique whereby the
probability of a failure, expressed in terms of expected failure frequency, is multiplied
by the consequence of such a failure to arrive at risk. Failure risk is determined
cumulatively over a given longer period of time as well as on a yearly basis. The
method is structured in four main parts:
a. Identify the possible failure causes and derive potential failure frequencies
b. Identify the most likely failure type distribution
c. Identifythe consequences of pipelinefailure
d. Combine parts 1 and 3 to derive risk levels
Information required or input required to use this tool are:
pipeline fluids (those covered are: crude oil, natural gas, sour natural gas, NGL, fuel
gas, gas oil/diesel, kerosene/naphtha/gasoline, LPG, ethylene, propylene and two-
phase oil/gas fluids)
impact failure statistics and failure frequencies
construction/material defect failure statistics andfailure frequencies
corrosion statistics or estimated possible mechanisms/expected time to first failure
(wall thickness, critical defect depth, inspection surveys, actual corrosion data),
annual corrosion failure frequencies
Outputs from this tool are safety, environmental and economic risk comparison
assessments that can be used in support of pipeline design and operation decisions.
ASPIN can be used in the development of HSE Cases as part of the HSE MS including
input into Hazards and Effects Register. ASPIN identifies and assesses all potential
major hazards, evaluates the risks and the effectiveness of the various measures to
reduce the risks to the lowest practicable level.
2.2.2 Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis (ESSA)
This to is use in determination of the ability of the emergency systems to withstand
severe accident conditions. If performance criteria for essential safety systems are
developed as part of the process which evaluates fires and explosions an ESSA as a
separate exercise may not be required.
The process includes identification of all the safety and emergency systems.
Assessment of the criticality of each system with respect to preventing escalation,
protecting the Temporary Refuge(s) (TR(s)) and enabling escape/evacuation. The
critical systems are then assessed to determine their vulnerability to explosions and
fires.
This tool requires detailed information on the type and layout ofsafety and emergency
systems for example ESD power systems and emergency communications. Fire and
explosion scenario data from the Explosion Protection Review (EPR) and Fire and
Explosion Analysis (FEA).
This tool will deliver identification of critical emergency equipment and system
locations and assessment of the vulnerability of the critical systems during direct and
escalated events.
2.2.3 Environmental Assessment (EA)
EA predict the significant chemical, biological and socio-economic effects of an activity
and to make recommendations on activities, sites, techniques and technologies to be
adopted in order to maximise the positive, and minimise the negative effects.
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EA is conducted sustematically using these methods:
a. Acquisition of environmental description in terms of abiotic, biotic and human
environments
b. Identify project environmental hazards and characterise the environment
c. Evaluate the magnitude and significance of environmental effects
d. Determination of any environmental control and recovery management
requirements
Information on site and potential waste product descriptions, project description
including process materials and sources, materials ofconstruction, project schedule and
both strategic and local economic benefits.
EA will provide an Environmental Statement and also mitigation and recovery
measures during operations Environmental report covering suggested monitoring
programmes and environmental management systems will be the final output. This
report can be used as the basis for public meetings and exhibitions if required.
2.2.4 Fire and Explosion Analysis (FEA)
FEA is a general term for aprocess which identifies and evaluates all fire and explosion
hazardous events as a basis for risk reduction and for preparing performance criteria for
essential safety systems and the arrangements required for Escape, Evacuation and
Rescue (EER).
The location and type of all potential fires (and explosions) are identified. The
capability of the existing or required fire protection (and explosion relief) measures are
established together with the corresponding performance standards. Estimates of the
damage potential of each event are made. The FEA process is a fundamental part of
developing an installation Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) model and can either
be undertaken as part of the QRA or as a stand alone exercise providing input to the
QRA.
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Detailed information on plant layout, fire areas, hazardous areas, flammable inventories,
fire and safety equipment layout, passive fire protection location, fire water piping runs
and anyother pertinent dataare required for implementation of this tool.
All potential fire and explosion events are identified and a number subjected to more
detailed evaluation. Requirements for the essential safety systems to manage fire and
explosions and for EER are identified.
2.2.5 FIREPRAN
FIREPRAN is a structured review technique for the review and assessment of:
a. hydrocarbon release and combustion related risks in a facility
b. the fire and explosion control and recovery preparedness measures in place.
c. the capability to meet the performance standards set and satisfy the objectives and
criteria set for the management of fire and explosion hazards.
FIREPRAN will identify deficiencies and opportunities for improvement in order to
meet objectives with respect to fire and explosion management. FIREPRAN is not
suited to complex, compact integrated facilities.
A multi-disciplined team uses a structured HEMP compatible approach to identify
hazards related to hydrocarbon releases and explosions and develops a hazards and
effects hierarchy. The hazard control measures and related hazardous events mitigation
and recovery measures are recorded in a hazards and effects register. Potential fire and
explosion scenarios are developed enabling review of the resources needed to respond
effectively to these incidents. Resources needed to respond effectively to fire and
explosion hazardous event scenarios are compared with those already in place. Results
are presented with opportunities for improved risk reduction measures as appropriate to
plant criticality.
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There are 3major requirements for FIREPRAN. Process flow schemes, plot plans, plant
layouts and hazardous area drawings Fire system and fire water piping drawings, fire
areas, equipment layout, fire and blast walls and passive fire protection drawings
Operating and maintenance philosophies
This technique permits the identification ofhazards as well as potential, related fire and
explosion scenarios. It assists line management in the process ofdeveloping realistic,
cost effective, control and recovery measures which can be justified in terms of
reducing risks to personnel, environment, assets and production, to tolerable levels.
Deliverables take the form ofa hazards and effects register, fire and explosion scenario
development sheets and a set of recommendations for actions needed to achieve
tolerable risk levels.
2.2.6 HAZID (Hazard Identification)
HAZID is a technique to identify at an early stage in a green or brown field project or
development plan the major Hazards which must be removed or managed. A multi-
disciplined team review of the overall project development proposal (including
infrastructure) plant design and operation together with its impact on the local
environment. The study uses a step-by-step methodology and a checklist ofguide words
to identify hazards and assess the influence these hazards may have on the project
development strategy and design philosophy. The scope will encompass both current
and future life cycle issues.
HAZID process requires Information pack on project, its potential scope and
environmental issues. All available conceptual and preliminary drawings and
development plans must also be provided for HAZID. Inputof major hazards identified
to Hazards and Effects Register together with recommendations in priority order. An
initial statementon hazard manageability and assurance needs.
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2.2.7 HAZOP (Hazard andOperability Study)
HAZOP identifies the Hazards, Effects and Operability problems relating to the process
design and intended method ofplant operation which must be removed or managed in
the operation. HAZOP can be divided into 4 stages.
Coarse HAZOP - Early study to identify basic flaws in design which would be costly to
correct later.
Main HAZOP - Primary vehicle for identification of hazards, effects and operability
problems. Held when the front end engineering design is almost complete so that
systems can be covered in detail.
Final HAZOP - Coverage of those systems not sufficiently developed for consideration
in the Main HAZOP, particularly vendor data, and a formal review of action responses
to previous HAZOPs.
Procedural HAZOP - Identification of hazards and operability problems arising from
procedures such as commissioning, maintenance and other non-continuous procedures.
Health and environmental aspects must beincluded on the same basis as safety
A multi-disciplined team review using a structured step-by-step methodology with the
application ofparameter and guide word combinations to sections (nodes) of the system
to identify hazards and operability problems normally with a facility but also with
procedures.
Coarse HAZOP - Large nodes concentrating on major issues, requires a team of
experienced senior engineers. The recommendations from a Coarse HAZOP may
involve significant changes to the design.
Main HAZOP - Rigorous application ofthetechnique to relatively small nodes, requires
a team of experienced engineers with extensive project experience.
Final HAZOP - Rigorous application of the technique to relatively small nodes, requires
similar team as for Main HAZOP with the addition of vendor representatives. At this
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stage recommendations should be concentrated on 'will it work' rather than 'it would
improve the safety ofdesign to have'.
Procedural HAZOP - Application of specialised guide words to operating procedures,
requires a team similar to that for main HAZOP with greater emphasis on operational
personnel.
The information needed to conduct HAZOP study are:
Coarse HAZOP - Basic layouts, process flow schemes (PFSs) and any operating/control
philosophies that are available.
Main HAZOP - Process and Utility Process Engineering Flow Schemes, (PEFSs,
UEFSs) Operating and Control Philosophies, Cause and Effect Diagrams, Process S
Final HAZOP EFSs and Vendor drawings, data, previous HAZOP findings and
responses and any design changes since last HAZOP.afeguarding Drawings, line lists,
alarm and trip settings.
Procedural HAZOP - As for MainHAZOP and Operating Procedures.
HAZOP outputs or deliverables can be summarize:
Coarse HAZOP - Recommendations for adjustment to design options, QRA studies and
other supporting investigations. A risk ranking may be given to assist in prioritising the
actions. This list may be incorporated into the Hazards and Effects register for the
project.
Main HAZOP - Recommendations to amend the design to remove or reduce hazards
and operability problems. Categorisation of the recommendations into approximate risk
groups to assist in prioritising the actions. This list should be used to update the Hazard
register for the project.
Procedural HAZOP - Recommendations to amend the procedures to remove or reduce
hazards and operating problems. This will allow Safety Critical Procedures/Operations
to be identified.
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2.2.8 Health Risk Assessment (HRA)
HRA is process for identification of health hazards in the workplace and subsequent
evaluation of risk to health, taking account of existing control measures. Where
appropriate, theneed for further measures to control exposure is identified.
HRA consistsof a number of steps:
Step 1 Define management's role andresponsibilities and allocate resources
Step 2 Define structure for implementation (identify assessment units; assessment team;
job types; tasks; hazardous agents)
Step 3 For each job type gather information on agents and their harmful effects; nature
and degree of exposure; screening and performance criteria
Step 4 Evaluate theriskto health (assign severity rating and exposure rating)
Step 5 Decide on remedial action
Step 6 Record the health risk assessment
Step 7 Review the health risk assessment.
HRA requires Detailed information on hazards and effects (e.g. toxic properties of
chemicals); exposures (e.g. exposure levels to toxic chemicals); performance of existing
controls; information from health surveillance records, etc.
HRA, as a tool for use as part of HEMP, assists to identify, evaluate and control health
risks related to the company's operations to a level 'as low as reasonably practicable*.
The recommendations emerging from the HRA provide the input into the HSE MS to
ensure ongoing control of health risks and continual improvement in health
performance.
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2.2.9 Job Hazard Analysis(JHA)
JHA is Identification of potential problems within a job task that could lead to
hazardous situations. Elimination or reduction of the hazard by development of safe
working procedures. The method is derived from Task Analysis. It is a structured step-
by-step team analysis of the job. Initially the job is broken down into individual steps
which are then analysed sequentially to identify potential injuries to personnel, damage
to equipment and pollution ofthe environment. The controls and preventative measures
are considered and if found to be inadequate remedial recommendations are made.
Consideration is also given to the establishment ofrecovery measures ifnecessary.
JHA requires Job description, plans and drawings. Historical records of accidents and
near misses. Team members with technical competence relevant to the job being
analysed must also participate.
Step-by-step analysis of each job highlighting potential departures from normal
practice, with associated hazards and recommendations for remedial action will be
deliver from this technique. The analysis also identifies the accident prevention
responsibilities for key personnel. The report can also be used as the basis for the
development/ modification of operating/working procedures.
2.2.10 Physical Effects Modelling (PEM)
PEM will model the physical behaviour of the potential release of a hazardous fluid or
substance and subsequent related events to determine a measure of the effect, in terms
of loading, on people, the environment and assets for each potential outcome. The
physical effects, such as dispersion, explosion over pressures and heat radiation are
calculated as input to assess potential extent of loss of life or damage. Use of step-by-
step modelling allows potential escalation scenarios to be assessed.
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Detailed information on: physical properties, such as density and toxicity;
environmental factors, such as wind velocity, humidity ambient temperature, and
geometrical obstructions, confinement are input for PEM. Information on process flows
and any mitigating measures, such as inventory ESD or blowdown systems will also
assist this tool. Access to sophisticated consequence modelling computer programs,
e.g. FRED, HG SYSTEMS and SCOPE will automate this technique.
This tool will deliver data on the potential consequential loadings of previously
identified hazardous scenarios with respect to the potential effects to personnel, the
environment and the facilities.
2.2.11 Process Hazard Review (PHR)
PHR is an assessment ofthe safety status ofexisting process plant. It is intended for use
when a plant has been in operation for a considerable time and/or has undergone
equipment modifications and operation changes. It isused to provide an HSE Assurance
report for ongoing operations in advance of major modifications or for life extension
evaluations. PHR is an 'expert review' led by an experienced leader, containing design
engineers but heavily weighted towards plant operators and maintenance staff. The
review primarily focuses on potential causes of'loss of containment'.
The study progresses through the plant looking at each major equipment items, applying
a leader's checklist (aide-memoire) ofcauses of loss ofcontainment. The current design
and operation of the plant is assessed and a critical examination made of the revision
history to identify any causes of release resulting from changes to the design and
operation of the equipmentitem sincecommissioning.
The team also reviews any hazards arising from variations (due to the age of the plant)
from current design or operating standards.
The technique assumes that most of the drawings are near to current status. The
meetings are normally held on the plant with regular site visits to check any details not
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'as built' on drawings. The latest version of the Process Engineering Flow Schemes
(PEFS) is used as the major study document to ensure complete coverage ofthe scope
of the study. Additional information required includes the cause and effect diagrams
and the full revision history and incident reports for the plant together with changes in
the operating envelope and operation/maintenance procedures.
The expertise ofthe team is ofcritical importance. Where data are incomplete the PHR
technique is applicable but success relies heavily on the study team containing operating
staff with considerable depth of experience and knowledge of the plant throughout its
operating life.
Final report from PHR showing the identified hazards, their causes and the concern of
the team together with recommendations for any remedial action including, if
appropriate, more detailed HAZOP in discrete areas.
2.2.12 SAFOP (Electrical Safety and Operability Study)
SAFOP is the identification ofpotential hazards to personnel in the vicinity of electrical
systems. Critical assessment of electrical network and plant design and analysis of
operator actions to determine areas of potential operator error. This process also
includes making recommendations to eliminate or reduce risks.
A multi-disciplined team anda structured step by step methodology areused.
SAFAN - Hazards present in construction, commissioning and operation of electrical
systems are examined in relation to the safety of personnel in the vicinity.
SYSOP - Examination is made of the control systems, the main items of plant and their
auxiliaries in relation to any limitations and their effects on the overall system
operability.
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OPTAN - Considers probable tasks to be under taken during normal and upset
conditions. The usability of equipment and clarity of instructions are reviewed with the
aim ofreducing the potential for human error as low as is reasonably practicable.
Detailed electrical system design and layout drawings, control circuit diagrams, system
designs and functional specifications, and electrical system operating and emergency
procedures are needed to conduct SAFOP. A report will be produce from SAFOP.
Report detailing the findings of the audit and where necessary suggest some
recommendations categorised as 'Strongly Recommended', 'Advice' or call for further
information 'Information Required'.
2.2.13 Structural Consequence Analysis (SCA)
SCA is an assessment of the response of a structure under fire conditions.
Determination of the extent of any failure under fire loading and, if necessary, proposal
of remedial measures. Coarse analysis is based on determining the time to failure of the
structure from linear elastic techniques. This analysis determines those structures which
are critical and which should be the subject of more detailed analysis. Detailed analysis
is based on non-linear analysis methods. These allow the true collapse load of the
structure to be estimated by modelling elastic-plastic behaviour of the structure at
elevated temperatures. The USFOS analysis programmay be used for these studies.
SCA requires details of potential fires from FEA , data on the type and layout of
existing fire protection facilities. Detailedstructural drawings.
Report on the ability of the structure to withstand the fire scenarios identified will be
deliver. This will reveal if there exists the potential exists for fire to lead to progressive
collapse of the structure or loss of the TR within the required endurance period. If
necessary recommendations for remedial actions and distribution of protective
equipment should be made.
20
2.2.14 Temporary Refuge/Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis
(TR/EERA)
TR/EERA is the analysis of escape to TR, the provisions within the TR system, and
Evacuation, Escape and Rescue with respect to the major scenarios previously identified
for comparison against respective acceptance standards highlighting critical elements
and revealing any shortfalls.
The EERA/TRA comprises three related elements:
a goal analysis which considers how the goals for the EER process will be satisfied in
likely EER situations as a basis for determining the adequacy of the proposed
arrangements
an escape and evacuation time analysis which considers the time needed to complete all
phases of the EER process under conditions which maybe present when there is a need
for EER
a TR impairment analysis to determine the frequency that the TR andrelated evacuation
facilities will be impaired.
TR/EERA requires detailed information on the TR/EERA provisions and details of the
major hazard scenarios identified. Details of installation layout including muster
stations, refuges, evacuation points and escape to sea facilities. Input data from Fire and
Explosion Analysis (FEA), Smoke Ingress Analysis (SIA) and Emergency Systems
Survivability Analysis (ESSA).
This technique will produce a formal record of the EER facilities and arrangements with
details of the directand escalated impact of the identified hazard scenarios coupled with
considerations on the likelihood of their occurrence.
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2.3 Conclusion remarks
HSE MS is a structured set of controls for managing HSE; to ensure and to demonstrate
the HSE objectives set in the policy are met. HSE MS is widely applied in current
business as requirement. The main objective of implementing HSE MS is to ensure all
hazards and risks are at ALARP. HSE tools represent HSE elements that are needed to
be in place to achieve this. Literature study reveals there is a weakness in integration of
HSE MS and HSE elements and also data management of current practice. This study
aims to tackle these issues. Therefore, this upholds the originality "of this study to





This research project can be divided into 3 major phase. The first phase is study of
current HSE MS. The second stage is integration of HSE elements into the developed
HSE MS. The final stage of this project is to convert this integrated system as a
software application for usage. Shell Malaysia Trading Distribution Bagan Luar depot
will be the focal point of this study.
3.1.1 Study of HSE MS Model
The first phase in completing this research is to familiarize with HSE MS elements.
There is also the need to review current practice HSE MS. Shell Malaysia Trading
Distribution HSE MS was studied as the basis for this project. This is due to the fact
that Shell Malaysia Trading Distribution depot at Bagan Luar is the case study for this
project. Thecurrent HSE MS applied in Bagan Luardepot
Figure 3: Shell Malaysia Trading Distribution HSE MS '
Policy and Strategic Objectives
Organisation, Responsibilities
Resources, Standards & Doc.
Management Review
Corrective \ction & Impmvenicnt
Corrective Action & Improvement
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This phase also include study of the depot itself. The activities and present identified
hazards at depot were obtained through depot HSE Case and Hazard Register. The
depot is segregated into 4 zones for the purpose of thisproject. The zones are:
Jetty Operations (JO) - this zone covers the jetty within the depot where tankers and
ferries berth. Tankers supply the refined oil while ferries refill their tanks.
Tank Farm (TF) - this zone covers the bounded tank area at this depot. This are
represents the peak hazard level at the depot. The tanks in this zone are storage
tanks, doping tanks and skid tanks. The refine oil from jetty is supplied through
pipeline to doping tank. After addition of additives the fuel will be stored in storage
tank.
Filling Gantry (FG) - this zone is interconnected to storage tank through a pipeline.
Tankers are filled with fuel at this zone.
Storage Facility (SF) - this zone is located between the jetty and tank farm.
Additives and waste are stored here.
3.1.2 Integration of HSE elements in HSE MS - Design of HSE MS tool.
The integration of HSE elements into HSE MS is actually the designing phase of the
HSE MS tool itself. The key goal in integrating HSE elements is to ensure hazards and
risk at ALARP. There are 4 major elements integrated in HSE MS in achieving this
goal.
The first element is to recognize and acknowledge the presence of hazard in depot
operations and activities. The HSE element similar to this is hazard mapping. A hazard
map that illustrates the hazard at classified zone of depot is integrated in the HSE MS
tool. This map also illustrates the activities conducted at the specified zone. This map
was prepared through study of depot HSE Case.
The second element is performance monitoring. This is a control in HSE MS.
Performance monitoring is an essential HSE element in generating good HSE
performance. EQA 1974 also requires industrial practitioners to monitor the
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environment performance. The developed HSE MS tool encompasses performance
monitoring of HSE Key Performance Indicator (KPI), hazardous waste and accident
reports. The parameters and database for HSE KPI, hazardous waste and accident
reports was generated for the HSE MS tool after consultation and reference with
supervisor and external supervisor.
The third HSE element integrated in HSE MS is the Hazard Effects Management
Process (HEMP). HEMP is the most important HSE elements in achieving ALARP.
The principles and basis of HEMP are summarized in the following steps. The findings





Step 1 is to systematically identify the hazards, the threats and potential hazardous
events and effects which may affect, or arise from, a company's operation throughout
the total life cycle of the operation.
Step 2 is to systematically evaluate (assess) the risks from the identified hazards against
accepted screening criteria, taking into account the likelihood of occurrence and the
severity ofany consequences to employees, assets, the environment and the public. This
includes the risks associated with deviation from limits set for environmental and
occupational health hazards.
Step 3 and 4 will evaluate and implement appropriate measures to reduce or eliminate
risks. Risk reduction measures include those to prevent or control incidence (i.e.
reducing the probability of occurrence) and to mitigate effects (i.e. reducing the
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consequences). Mitigation measures include steps to prevent escalation of developing
abnormal situations and to lessen adverse effects on Health, Safety and the
Environment. Risk reduction measures also include recovery preparedness measures
which address emergency procedures as well as restoration and compensation
procedures to recover.
HEMP was developed to provide a structured approach to the analysis of safety hazards
throughout the life cycle of this depot. The arrangements identified as necessary to
manage assessed threats and potential consequences and effects are then incorporated
for existing operations as Hazard Register. HEMP in the HSE MS tool covers both
qualitative risk assessment and quantitative risk assessment.
Qualitative risk assessment employs experience and judgment in conducting HEMP.
Results from this assessment are incorporated in Hazard Register in this tool. HSE tools
integrated in the developed HSE MS tool to assist qualitative risk assessment are Risk
Assessment Matrix, Bowtie diagram and HAZOP.
Quantitative risk assessment provides a structured approach to assessing the potential
for incidents and expressing this potential numerically. Statistical values are derived for
potential loss of life and damage to resources and environment. These values should not
be interpreted as unavoidable and acceptable losses resulting from the operations
considered, but as a yardstick to measure safety, to raise awareness for the potential of
accidents and thereby developing measures to prevent them. HSE tool adapted in the
developed HSE MS tool to facilitate quantitative risk assessment is Fault Tree Analysis
(FTA). Quantitative risk assessment for this study only focuses on tank farm. This is
because tank farm is the highest hazard level zone at the depot.
The final element integrated in the developed tool is Emergency Response Preparedness
(ERP). ERP was developed for the depot through study of various practiced ERP. The
presence of ERP in developed HSE MS tool signals the depot is prepared and proves
identified hazards and risks are at ALARP.
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3.1.3 Development of HSE MS tool
The development of HSE MS tool requires literacy in IT. Therefore, trade of identified
programs and software needs to be acquired to complete this project. TJie project is now
in its final phase which is the execution phase. The HSE MS tool which was design in
previous phase will be converted as a software application during this phase. The tools
identified have been finalized after considerations of several alternatives based on
current available resources. The tools will beintegrated indeveloping the HSE MS tool.














Figure 2 describes the system architecture for the HSE MS tool that is developed in this




The client tier is the interface that will be display for users of this application. User will
input data and retrieve data using this interface. Dreamweaver with simple multimedia
function from Macromedia Flash will be manipulated for the client tier. The interface
will be interactive. User can input data for performance monitoring into HSE KPI
database, hazardous waste, accident reports and investigations into database of past
accidents, emergency response exercise into the emergency response exercise database
and also audit items into the audit database. The terminal operations and activities will
be represented in map form and user can retrieve the data and hazard register data by
simply clicking on areas on the map.
The information tier will be developed using Microsoft Access. There will be 8
databases for this tool. User will trigger application on interface to retrieve the
databases. The middle tier controls interaction between application clients and
application data. It acts as an intermediary between data in information tier and client
tier. IIS is the front end of the middle tier and it will act as the server or host. Active
Server Page (ASP) is the scripting for IIS. The middle tier will control data traffic of
input on interface to database and retrieval of data from database to interface
3.1.4 Computer networks
Transparency is another added feature in this HSE MS tool. It is well known that the
Achilles' heel of current HSE MS is that it is in manual form. It will not only result in
loss ofdata of HSE MS and inefficiency but also limits the coverage area. This tool will
enable personnel to access and explore HSE MS tool through network. This is because
the HSE MS to is a simple application software that can launch from desktop
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computers. Local Area Network facility at depot creates a launch pad1 for transparency
and widens coverage area of HSE MS. Therefore, more people will understand and
apply HSE MS tool in theirjob and subsequently this will create an efficient HSE MS.
Efficient here refers to ability to achieve ALARP and also cultivate good HSE culture
among personnel.
They are two major categories which communication networks are traditionally
classified which is:
a. wide area networks (WAN)
b. local area networks (LAN)
Wide area network covers a large geographical area, require the crossing of public
right-of-ways, and rely at least in part on circuit provided by a common carrier. WAN
consists of a number of interconnected switching nodes. A transmission from any one
devices is routed through these internal nodes to the specified destination device. These
nodes are not concerned with the content of the data. WAN is implemented using





e. ISDN and Broadband ISDN
LAN is a communication network that interconnects a variety ofdevices and provides a
means for information exchange among those devices. LAN makes use of a broadcast
network approach rather than a switching approach. With a broadcast communication
network, they are no intermediate switching nodes. At each station, there is a
transmitter/receiver that communicates over a medium shared by other stations. A
transmission from any one station is broadcast to andreceived by all otherstation. Data
are usually transmitted in packets. Because the medium is shared, only one station at a
time can transmit a packet.
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They are several key distinctions between LANs and WANs. The scope of LAN is
usually small, typically a single building or a cluster ofbuildings. This is what always
be differentiate between LAN and WAN. The internal data rates of LAN are also much
greater than those of WANs. Figure 1 below shows how LANs and WANs work.
Figure 5: Application of LAN and WAN
3.2 Tools Required
3.2.1 Dreamweaver
Dreamweaver will be utilize to create interface for the client tier. Users will input and
view retrieved information from HSE MS tool through this interface. The interface will
only be functional for display. Dreamweaver can be integrated with Macromedia Flash
to enhance multimedia characteristic of the interface. Thus, a more interactive and
interesting interface will be develop for the HSE MS tool. The other considered tool for
client tierwas Microsoft Visual Basic but Dreamweaver waspreferred as its application
is drag and drop basis and requires minimal scripting compared to Microsoft Visual
Basic. Furthermore, Dreamweaver produces more interesting and refreshing interface
compared to Microsoft Visual Basic.
30
3.2.2 Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS)
IIS is an enterprise-level web server that is included with Microsoft 2000. IIS is
applicable for both LAN and WAN usage. It allows computers to serve documents. US
will allow computer to act as host or server to connect client tier and information tier.
IIS will be the front end of the middle tier. IIS will control data traffic between client
tier and information tier. IIS was chosen on the basis that the identified facility uses
Microsoft 2000 as its operating system.
3.2.3 Active Server Pages (ASP)
ASP will be utilized as back-end of the middle tier. ASP is a server technology that
dynamically builds documents in response to client requests. ASP will he in the form of
source code or scripting. ASP is processed by an ActiveX component called a scripting
engine. An ASP file has the file extension .asp and the common languages like
JavaScript and VBScript are used as for ASP scripting. ASP was chosen because it is
the back-end and scripting program for IIS.
3.2.4 Microsoft Access
Microsoft Access is utilized as database for HSE MS tool. Microsoft Access is the
information tier. The database will store all input data and also stored data for the
retrieval by user. Microsoft Access was preferred because it is not complex and user
friendly compared to Oracle and Visual Basic. Microsoft Access provides an interface
for user to build database but Oracle requires user to do scripting. Microsoft Access is
the obvious alternative as time is constraint in completing this study and learning




Figure 6 represents the system flow for HSE MS tool. The usage of this tool should
eliminate indicated weaknesses of currently practice HSE MS. The glaring weakness
would be the fact HSE MS is manual oriented and therefore there are tendency of
misplacement or loss of data. This impairment can lead to disastrous effects. It is well
documented that the Piper Alpha and Longford incidents are retribution due to this
weakness. The embedment of HSE MS tool in operations of depot should the least
minimize the probability reoccurrence of such tragedy. This tool through the integrated
HSE elements helps to maintain hazards and risks at ALARP.
HSE MS tool can be divided into 3 levels as depicted in figure 4.1. Level 1 comprises
login and general page. Level 2 compromises HSE MS, terminal operations,
performance monitoring (MIS), Hazard Effects Management Process (HEMP), accident
reports and investigations, Emergency Response Preparedness (ERP), hazardous waste,
audit and documents page. Level 3 is dependent subsystem for Level 2 pages. This
section will discuss the elements of this tool according to the 3 levels. Discussion on














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.1 HSE MS Tool Interface
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Figure 7: HSE MS tool interface sample
HSE MS tool interface is attached in figure 7. A standard interface format was
developed for this tool. This step was taken to make tool user friendly and easily
navigated. The interface below is for Performance Monitoring (MIS) page. Table 1
describes the function button on the interface.
Command button Description
Menu List the pages that can be explore by user
Transport user to specific page by clicking on menu
Back Transport user to previous viewed page
Home Transport user to general page which is the navigation page
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Contacts List the contacts number for ERP
Logout User can exit tool through this button
Submit Transport input data to database
Reset Clear input data by user
Input User input data into tool
Table 1: Interface command buttons description
4.2 Level 1
Level 1 compromises login and general page. Login page acts as security barrier for
tool. Client or user must key in username and password. User will be transported to




Clients type can be differentiate according to access to tool. Guest only has the rights to
view tool. Guest covers contractors and visitors at depot. They can use this tool to refer
to manuals, observe performance monitoring and also hazards present at the depot.
Therefore this tool acts as an induction kit for first time visitors at depot. This tool will
help them to understand the hazards at the depot and make the aware and preparebefore
entering depot environment. This will also cultivate good HSE culture amongusers.
User level client have the privileges to input data into the tool databases. User level
usually encompasses supervisors and executives at depot. They are the personnel held
accountable in monitoring KPI, submitting data for HEMP, submitting accident reports,
parameters for hazardous waste management and also audit findings for action. User
level client are vital in ensuring the tool is living and fully utilized.
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The highest level client is administrator. Administrator access is assigned to depot
manager and also HSE Advisor. Administrator has privileges to input data into tools
and also delete and modify tool features. The main role of admistrator is vet data in tool.
Thiswill ensure tool is livingand accurate. Thus, optimizing efficiency of this tool.
User will be transported to general page once tool recognize their level of authority in
accessing the tool. General page is the navigation page for this tool. Menu on general
page list all level 2 elements in this tool. It is worth noting that the level 2 elements are
the most important feature for this tool. This is because they are the HSE elements
integrated in this tool and they are the controls of HSE MS. The general page will
transport user to the desired page on level 2.
4.3 Level 2
4.3.1 HSE MS
Standards, procedure and works instructions are among controls embedded in HSE MS
to achieve HSE objectives. This tool covers these controls of HSE MS. This contains
the HSE MS manual for A+ Distribution which covers Bagan Luar depot. Personnel
inclusive of contractors and visitors to depot can view HSE MS manual to better
understand concept of HSE MS. This will raise awareness and knowledge of hazards at
depot and achieve goals of maintaining hazards at ALARP. Raise of HSE literacy will
also cultivate HSE culture which will improve HSE performance of depot. This page
also offers standards for Minimum Health Management Standards (MHMS), Global
Minimum Environmental Requirements Standard. These are the standards set by Shell
which are utilized as controls in this tool. There is also a manual on Permit to Work
(PTW) system which ensures safe work practice in operations of Shell terminals.
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4.3.2 Terminal Operations
Hazard mapping is among HSE elements identified to be integrated in this tool.
Terminal operations page helps user to recognize and acknowledge presence and
location of hazard at depot. The terminal hazard map segregate the -depot into zonal
section as mentioned in Methodology section. Terminal hazard map list the present
hazards on the depot map on zonal basis. This map is interconnected to hazard register.
The hazards register in under HEMP page. This feature of the tool will enhance
personnel awareness of where hazards are located. Precautionaryaction can be takenby
personnel upon venturing hazardous locations in depot. This feature can also assist new
personnel to know the depot and its hazard. These advantages can help the depot
maintain goodHSEperformance and support in ensuring HSEMS fulfill its purpose.
4.3.3 Performance monitoring (MIS)
Performance monitoring is an essential HSE element in generating good HSE
performance. EQA 1974 also requires industrial practitioners to monitor the
environment performance. Relevant Key Performance Indicators (KPI) has been
identified for monitoring of depot performance. The KPI are segregated into health,
safety and environment. The KPI must be updated on monthly basis by accountable
personnel. This staff shall be granted user level access to the tool. Input data for
parameters will be stored in database and can be retrieved for viewing. Environment
parameters will be automatically submitted to DOE on monthly basis. These parameters
are deemed compulsory for monitoring under EQA 1974. HSSE Advisor for Shell
Malaysia Trading Distribution also requires depot to submit all HSE parameters on
monthly basis. This is a scorecard item which will no appraise HSE performance but
also affects business performance of depot. This feature of the tool will manage data
systematically for present and future utilization. Performance monitoring feature will
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not only help achieve HSE objectives but it will also ease workload in submission of
parameters. Appendix 2 depicts the KPI monitored using this HSE MS tool.
4.3.4 Hazard Effects Management Process (HEMP)
Hazard Effects Management Process can be defined as the most integral feature in this
tool. As defined in Methodology section, HEMP provides a structured approach to the
analysis of safety hazards throughout the life cycle of this depot. The arrangements
identified as necessary to manage assessed threats and potential consequences and
effects are then incorporated for existing operations as Hazard Register. HEMP in the
HSE MS tool covers both qualitative risk assessment and quantitative risk assessment.
Once hazards and hazardous events have been identified, their causes, consequences
and probabilitycan be estimated and the risk determined. Risk assessment may be on a
qualitative or quantitative basis. Both involve the same steps. Qualitative methods may
be adequate for risk assessments of simple facilities or operations where the exposure of
the workforce, public, environment or the asset is low. Bagan Luar depot can be
classified as a simple facility. Therefore, qualitative risk assessment will be introduce
extensively in this developed tool. However, the application of quantitative methods is
considered to be desirable when:
several risk reduction options have been identified whose relative effectiveness is
not obvious
the exposure to the workforce, public, environment or the strategic value of the
asset is high, and reduction measures are to be evaluated
demonstration of relative risk levels and their causes to the workforce is needed to
make them more conscious of the risks
It is identified from qualitative risk assessment that hazard of fire at tank farm area is
high and usage of quantitative risk assessment for this hazard is needed. This was



















Risk is often defined as a function of the chance that a specified undesired event will
occur and the severity of the consequences of the event. When risk is assessed
qualitatively a Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM) may be used. When assessed
quantitatively, risk is derived from the product of chance and potential consequence.
For quantitative RA purposes, chance is usually expressed as the frequency of
occurrence. If no attempt is made to estimate the frequency, we may be driven by the
consequence into investingheavily on risk reduction measures which are ineffective.




















Many are concerned about the accuracy of the quantification and use this as a reason
why the technique should not be applied. However, whether we realize it or not, we are
always making implicit comparative quantification whenever we make a decision. What
we gain with QRA is a structured assessment of the risk instead of an intuitive type of
quantification. The numbers used in a QRA may be very approximate, but at least we
have broken down the problem into its basic elements and made an objective judgement
for each of these elements rather than an overall judgement on a largely subjective
basis.
QRA is a powerful decision-making tool which can assist in the selection of acceptable
solutions to safetyproblems. This technique can be defined as the formal and systematic
approach to identifying hazards, potentially hazardous events, and estimating likelihood
and consequences to people, environment and assets, of incidents developing from these
events. The total process of risk analysis, interpretation of results and recommendations
of corrective actions is usually called 'Risk Assessment'. The application of QRA has
contributed not only to increased safety but also to improved cost effectiveness in many
areas.
A HSE tool used in this HSE MS tool for quantitative risk assessment is Fault Tree
Analysis (FTA). This feature in the develop tool is only applicable for quantification
risk of fire at tank farm. Fault Tree analysis is a common probabilistic technique applied
in reliability analysis and, to a lesser extent, risk assessment. It allows the user to
concentrate on a particular system failure, which is usually giving rise to the 'top event'
or 'branch event' of an Event Tree. The Fault Tree approach traces back the possible
causes of an identified 'top event' or 'branch event*. This analysis is characterised by the
question: 'How can it occur?', The forward analysis is the Event Tree analysis; it starts
with an initiating event ('top event') andprojects possible consequences from that event.
This analysis concentrates on the question: 'What happens if it occurs?' In general the
construction of Fault Trees and Event Trees can only be achieved by relying on the
experience of those persons who are familiar with thereal system under consideration.
Fault Trees cannot take account of sequential failures or time dependency. This limits
their usefulness in risk analysis where the development of scenarios with time is
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important. A Fault Tree consists of two types of building blocks: GATE symbols and
EVENT symbols. Events are represented by rectangles. GATE symbols connect events
according to their causal relations. GATES may have two or more input events but only
one output event. In this tool only two types of GATES, the OR GATE and the AND







Output event occurs if all input
events occur simultaneously.
Output event occurs ifat least one
of the input events occurs.
OR GATE
Figure 10: AND GATE and OR GATE
All possible combinations of gates and events are allowed, provided the following two
conditions are satisfied:
a. The Fault Tree must have a typical tree structure, ie all events and gates should
converge into a single event: the top event.
b. Events are connected by gate symbols, ie an event is never directly connected to
another event.
Often the construction of Fault Trees is a useful exercise in itself, for it provides an
insight into the possible failure modes of sometimes rather complex systems. However,
the success of Fault Trees is mainly due to the quantitative aspects. The probability
calculus associated with AND and OR gates is a direct result of the standard ways in
which probabilities can be combined. It can be used to calculate the probability of an
event occurring within a certain time interval (alternatively the frequency of such an
event) or the probability of failure ondemand (unavailability). The definition of the top
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event is important both for deriving the appropriate logic and the calculus of
probabilities.
FTA was performed for top event ofmajor fire occurrence at tank farm. There 2 FTA
diagrams that are featured in the developed HSE MS tool under quantitative risk
assessment. The first FTA deals with top event of fire break out at tank farm and the
second FTA ismore detailed with top event ofmajor fire occurrence at tank farm. Both





Figure 11: FTA for major fire hazard
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Ignition source











































Figure 12: FTA major fire occurrence attank farm
Note; The text in the circles and gate symbols is used to provide a convenient label in
probability calculation formulae.
HSE MS tool will automatically generate probability of top event once user provides
the system with probability of risk for basic events. Basic events can be afrequencies or
probabilities. User should provide the accurate data base on statistical data of operations
at depot according to theory ofprobability and statistic.
43
QRA is features extensively in this tool. This assessment will conducted base on the
experience and judgement. Qualified personnel in groups should have user access to
this tool to complete qualitative risk assessment. This assessment is base on the HEMP
process with aim to maintain all identified hazards at ALARP. Therefore this tool





Identifying hazards for this depot will be performed using Hazard and Operability Study
(HAZOP). HAZOP is a systematic process to identify and manage the hazards
associated with change in the business; physical, procedural and process, management
and organizational and temporary changes. This is useful HSE tool that have been in
incorporated in thisHSE MS tool. HAZOP study was developed by ICI in theUKin the
1960's and is now widely used throughout the chemical and petroleum industries. It is
based upon the supposition that most problems are missed because the system is
complex rather than because of a lack ofknowledge onthepart of the design team.
The purpose of a HAZOP study is to identify potential hazards under all foreseeable
conditions. It should be incorporated as a step in the overall procedure for Change
Management, both in terms of safety and also the operability of theprocesses and plant.
The objective of effective change management, including temporary changes, being to
facilitate the efficient implementation of organisational changes and smooth, safe and
prompt commissioning of new plant, without extensive last minute modifications,
followed by trouble of continuing operations. A HAZOP study can also be used in part
as a training aid for plant personnel and in the preparation of Operating Manuals
The HAZOP study can, be used on a new/existing procedures, organisation changes,
operational activity, or as a way ofrigorously and systematically checking a design for
safety, operability and conformity with codes of practice etc. HAZOP study report can
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be used to demonstrate to interested external (Govemment/Community/etc) parties that
all possibleaction has been taken to identifyand eliminate hazards.
The procedure adopted in a HAZOP study is based on the generation of questions that
ensure comprehensive and systematic coverage of all the relevant areas in the design of
a change. These questions are asked in an ordered and creative manner by design and
operations personnel with the appropriate experience and expert knowledge of the
particular process design. The aim of the questions is to identify any design faults,
process deviations or system shortfalls that might exist which would lead to safety or
operability problems. The plant is considered section-by-section, line-by-line, and item-
by-item, butnever in complete isolation. The questions onthe process are based around
guidewords, which investigate deviations from the intention of the change. The
guidewords ensure that the questions will explore every conceivable way in which the
operations coulddeviate from the design intention.
A multi-disciplined team review using a structured step-by-step methodology with the
application ofparameter and guide word combinations to sections (nodes) of the system
to identify hazards and operability problems normally with a facility but also with
procedures. The team should consist of experienced engineers with extensive project
experience and depot operations experience, vendor representatives, contractors with
operation experience and HSE expert as an advisor. The leader of this HAZOP team is
held accountable to record study findings in the HSE MS tool. Therefore the team
leader can input HAZOP findings in tool and a user level client. The template is
available in the HSE MS tool and in Appendix 3.
The second step inqualitative risk assessment is to assess the hazards identified through
HAZOP. Risk Assessment Matrix is globally accepted HSE tool in assessing hazards
qualitatively. Risk Assessment Matrix and definition is presented in Appendix 4. The
integration of this tool in the HSE MS tool will help depot prove all hazard at ALARP
and ensure HSE MS is efficient.
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The next steps are to evaluate and implement appropriate measures to reduce or
eliminate risks. All the result from the 4 step will be input into HSE MS tool. The
interfaces for the 4 steps of qualitative risk assessment are attached in Appendix 5. The
result will be stored as Hazard Register. Hazard Register acts as an encyclopedia for
hazards at depot. This is the an integral tool in HSE MS. This is because this tool will
guide personnel in operations. The Hazard Register is represented according to zonal
areas of depot. The Hazard Register consists of the threats/ hazards, effects and
consequences, RAM, control, recovery. Therefore personnel can extract info on what
precaution measures have been installed and self precautionary steps they must take
during operations. Thewill alsounderstand recovery role the must take in event that the
hazard occur. The Hazard Register can also be post at the zone to raise awareness of
personnel .Thus, protecting health, safety and environment and achieving goal of HSE
MS tool.
Another added HSE tool in HEMP is Bowtie diagram. Bowtie diagram is an alternative
representation of Hazard Register. Bowtie diagram concept is represented in figure
below:
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sequence of events and failures lead
to the escalation of a hazardous event
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This feature will help user to better understand the Hazard Register. The bowtie
diagram is dependent to the Hazard Register. The hazards in Bowtie diagram is
represented indeed by hazard classification.
4.3.5 Accident Reports and Investigations
Road Transport is a major part of Shell Malaysia Distribution business. Past track
record projects that road transport incidents are a major contributor towards HSE
incident statistic for Bagan Luar depot. It is in this consideration that the HSE MS tool
includes portion of accident reports and investigation. This feature of HSE MS tool will
assist both procedural and performance wise. Haulier and driver are required to submit
accident report within 24 hours of incident. This tool will assist this procedure in a
sense that submitted reports will be automatically send via e-mail to relevant
management personnel. The reports will be stored in database of this tool and can be
retrieve for future reference. This will manage data efficiently and lesson learnt from
the accident will be optimized.
4.3.6 Emergency Response Preparedness (ERP)
ERP will be activated in the event of major hazard at depot. ERP procedure was
developed for operations of this depot. This feature also includes contact numbers for
emergency event and ERP exercise schedule. Contact numbers provide personnel
reference of who to contact during emergency. ERP exercise is important and it usually
includes external parties such as Fire department and medical personnel from nearby
hospital. This feature will aid training kit for personnel to prepare for emergency. The
ERP exercise schedule can help depot to demonstrate their responsible and action in
practicing good HSE practice.
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4.3.7 Hazardous Waste
Environmental Quality (Scheduled Waste) Regulations 1989 requires depotto provide
information on:
First Schedule - types of wastes generated
Second Schedule - notification of solid wastes
Third Schedule - labelling requirement for scheduled wastes
Fourth Schedule - waste ofpotential incompatibility
Fifth Schedule - inventory of scheduled waste
Sixth Schedule - consignment note for scheduled wastes
Seventh Schedule - information
This feature of the tool will assist depot operations to comply with DOE requirements.
The data submitted into the database of this tool will automatically send to appointed
DOE personnel. Waste inventory that have been developed and attached in HSE MS
tool is available in Appendix 6.
4.3.8 Audit
The idea of having an audit feature in this tool originated from Shell Malaysia Trading
Distribution HSE Advisor. This feature compromises self assessment tool, post audit
checklist and audit schedule. Self assessment tool can assist depot to gauge its HSE
performance. The assessment tool is contributed by Shell Malaysia Trading Distribution
HSE Advisor. Post audit checklist should be done after audit is completed. The
developed tool will track audit action items execution. Audit schedule will help depot to
be prepared for future audit.
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4.3.9 HSE Documents
HSE documents are HSE MS in action. The documents included in this section are
Terminal HSE Case, Road Transport HSE Case and HRA Case. Terminal HSE Case is
HSE MS in action. It is living proof that hazards are maintained at ALARP. Health Risk
Assessment (HRA) is a requirement of MHMS. HRA is the living proof that health
hazards are at ALARP. Road Transport HSE Case is the journey management of





The main problem encountered is communication problem. This project was done on
case study basis. Several industries were considered prior to this study. Majorityof the
depot only replied their answer after sometime. This condition create a major problem
due to time constrain. Shell Malaysia Trading Distribution depot at Bagan Luar was
chosen as they were the first to respond to proposal of this project. Furthermore, initial
communication has been established with them during industrial training. There are
various available software that can be incorporated into the HSE MS tool. Few
examples are Physical Effect Modeling software and Riskware. These software are not
freeware and thus license to use them needs to be obtained at certain monetary cost.
This problem is not deemed major as other applicable HSE tools have been
incorporated into the HSE MS tool. The development of this tool also requires high IT
literacy. Short time frame disable ability to acquire further IT knowledge that could
have better this tool.
5.2 Recommendations
This study to develop HSE MS tool has a great commercial potential. There are several
recommendations to further enhance this tool or application. The tool is still in Alpha
level testing and therefore several future recommendations have been listed. Resources
constraint especially in term of time resulting the Alpha version being developed with
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several enhancement options. The current HSE MS tool is localized to one depot.
Future enhance would expand the branch of the tool where several depots are
interconnected. The server will be handled by the main headquarters. This enhancement
is possible but the WAN should be utilized for this purpose. This added feature will
require the tool to utilize Oracle for its information tier.
Future study to improve the current study can focus on assessing whether the intact
controls optimize ALARP concept or over do it. This can be conducted using statistical
method. Inclusion on HSE software can also increase the marketability of this tool.
Quantitative risk assessment of this tool only covers FTA. Future work should
concentrate on inclusion of Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and Physical Effect Modeling.
Inclusion of these two tools will make quantitative risk assessment of HSE MS tool
more comprehensive. The current tool also practice HSE MS tool more manually.
Computer programming can be manipulated to generate the HSE elements in HSE MS
tool using less human participation. One example is to make RAM selection just by
clicking array rather than input of data. Attachment of HSE software will definitely add
commercial value to this tool.
There can also be virtual simulation of emergency response plan and also terminal
activities by adding multimedia characteristic. This enhancement will require the tool to
use Macromedia Flash application as a more domain interface application in client tier.
Microsoft Access database must also be supported by Oracle to store database of
probable scenarios for simulation. Security aspect can also be enhanced through
computer network management security knowledge. The current system only offer




HSE is a compulsory aspect to be considered in any industry and even process for that
matter. Various accidents and disasters have occurred due to negligence of HSE aspect.
Few of the major ones are the Alpha Piper incident, Union Charbide Bhopal incident
and the Longford incident The implementation of HSE MS as structured set of controls
for managing HSE; will ensure and to demonstrate the HSE objectives set in the policy
are met. HSE MS will also ensure business is legitimate and comply with law and
regulations. This study will further evolve HSE MS by producing it as a tool that is
easily navigate and execute using desktop computers. This tool should be marketable as
it will be utilize in Shell Malaysia Trading depot at Bagan Luar, Penang.
This project is on schedule based on time frame set during the preliminary report. The
HSSE MS tool will be developed using a three tier application model using tools -
Dreamweaver, IIS, ASP and Microsoft Access. Shell Malaysia Trading Distribution has
agreed to collaborate in this project and its HSSE Advisor has finalized the HSE MS
tool model. The identified facility to be the pioneer in applying this tool is Bagan Luar
depot in Penang. Therefore the development of this tool is based on the depot's
operations.
Optimization of resources through project planning and collaboration with industrial
practitioners is the key in ensuring this study is feasible and practicable. The end
product should be the development of HSE MS tool that is applicable for the industry
that participated during the study. This tool will be developed using identified tools and
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APPENDIX 2 - MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM (MIS)
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APPENDIX 4: RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX ABD DEFINITIONS
The Risk Matrix For Worksite HSE Case
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The Risk Matrix For Worksite HSE Case
IX





0 No Injury No injury or damage to health
1 Slight Injury Not detrimental to individual employability or to the
performance of present work
2 Minor Injury Detrimental to the performance of present work, such as
curtailment of activities or some day's of absence to
recover, up to a maximum of one week
3 Major Injury Leading to permanent partial disablement or unfitness to
work or detrimental to performance of work over an
extended period, such as long term absence
4 Single Fatality Single fatality or victim with permanent total disability
or unfitness for work. Also includes the possibility of
multiple fatalities (maximum of 3) in close succession
due to the incident, e.g. explosion
5 Multiple
Fatalities
May include four fatalities in close succession due to the
incident, or multiple fatalities (four or more) each at
different points and/or with different activities





0 No Damage No damage to equipment or asset
1 Slight Damage No disruption to the process. Minimum cost of repair.
(Estimated cost of below RM12.5K)
2 Minor Damage Possible brief disruption to the process. Isolation of
equipment for repair.
(Estimated cost between RM12.5 K to RM125K)
3 Localized
Damage
Plant partly down. Process can (possible) be re-started.
(Estimated cost of repair between RM125K to
RM1.25M)
4 Major Damage Partial loss of plant. Plant shut down for at most 2
weeks.




Total loss of plant. Extensive damage.
(Estimated cost of repair/replacement > RM12.5M)













No financial consequences. No
environmental risk.
0 liters 0 liters
1 Slight
Effect
Slight financial consequences. Local env.







Contamination. Damage sufficiently large
to effect the environment. Single
exceedance of statutory / prescribed
criteria. Single compliant. No permanent








Limited loss of discharge of known
toxicity. Repeatedly exceeding statutory










Severe environmental damage. The
OPCO
is required to take extensive measures to
restore the contaminated environment to
its original state. Extended exceedance of









Persistent severe environmental damage
or severe nuisance extending over a large
area. In terms of commercial or
recreational use or nature conservancy, a
major economic loss for the OPCO.







Examples of sensitive areas are areas such as beaches, marine life breeding ground,
catchment areas, water-front villages, forest reserves, upstream of rivers, parks, residential
areas etc.





0 No Impact No public awareness
1 Slight Impact Public awareness of the incident may exist. There is no
public concern
2 Limited Impact Some local public concern. Some complaints received.
Slight local media and/or political attention with




Regional public concern.Numerous complaints. Extensive
negative attention in local media. Slight national media
and/or local/regional political attention with possible
negative stance oflocal government and/or action groups.
4 National
Impact
National public concern. Continuing complaints. Extensive
negative attentionin the national media and/or
regional/national policies with potentially restrictive




International public attention. Extensive negative attention
in international media and national/international politics.
Potential to harm access to new areas, grant of licenses
and/or tax legislation. Concerted effort by action groups.
Adverse effects.
Definition of Risk To Reputation
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